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NOTES
Domestic Relations-Criminal Sanctions Against "ChildSnatching" in North Carolina
The American family, traditionally sanctioned as a bastion of
societal stability,1 is in the throes of fissure.2 The struggle between divorced spouses over the custody of their children has emerged as one of
the "most pernicious and tragic"' aspects of the familial rupture. The
battle for custody, characterized as transcending "the brutality and irregularity of guerilla warfare," 4 commonly crosses state lines,5 often
culminating in multiple interstate "child-snatchings." 6 The child,
1. The United States Supreme Court, frequently emphasizing the importance of
domestic cohesion, has awarded constitutional protection to the family unit. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (under the ninth
amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). See also
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
2. The divorce rate in the United States has consistently and drastically increased
in recent years, exceeding one million for the first time in 1975. In that year, an estimated 1,026,000 divorces were granted, double the number granted in 1966. By contrast the marriage rate declined in 1975 by 4.8%, representing the lowest rate since
1967. An estimated 2,126,000 marriages were performed in 1975 in the United States.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, 24 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS RE-

FORT No. 13, at 12-13 (1976).
The divorce rate in North Carolina is consistent with the national trend. In 1975,
22,107 divorces were granted, reflecting a 52% increase since 1970, and an almost 300%
increase since 1960. The state's marriage rate declined in 1975. N.C. DEP'T OF
HUMAN RESOURCES, 1 NORTH CAROLINA VrrAL STATISTICS 1975, at 1-6, 2-1 (1976).
3. Hudak, Seize, Run, and Sue: The Ignominy of Interstate Child Custody Litigation in American Courts,39 Mo. L. Rv. 521, 521 (1974).
4. Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REV.
379, 392 (1959).
5. Rapidly increasing divorce rates, see note 2 supra, coupled with unprecedented
individual and familial geographic mobility have made the interstate custody dispute,
once considered a rarity, commonplace. Article, Children in Transit: Child Custody
and Conflict of Laws, 6 U.C.D. L REv. 160, 161 (1973).
6. "Child-snatching" refers to the practice by which divorced or separated parents
obtain exclusive custody of their children, during or after custody disputes, by kidnapping them or by having them kidnapped. Within the context of this note the term
is used specifically with reference to transporting children to another state for this purpose. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text infra for discussion of the impetus to
child-snatch.
Although it is impossible to record the annual number of child-snatchings with complete accuracy, one account estimates it to be as high as 25,000 and reports of one professional agent who boasts of having effectuated 1,000 such snatchings. NEWSWEEK, Oct.

1276

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

many times no more than a pawn in the parental controversy," can be
permanently scarred by the lack of security and stability that results. 8
Presumably in an attempt to deter parental child-stealing and thereby
insure greater protection of the child's welfare, the North Carolina
Legislature in 1969 enacted General Statutes section 14-320.1, which
provides criminal sanctions for "snatching" children from this state.'
Section 14-320.1 specifically states that anyone who transports, or
causes to be transported, a child under the age of sixteen outside the
boundaries of North Carolina with the intent to violate a custody order
issued by this state shall be guilty of a felony. Such crime is punishable
by a fine, the amount of which rests with the discretion of the court,
by imprisonment for not more than three years, or both. The statute
also stipulates that keeping a child outside of North Carolina in violation
of a custody order for an excess of seventy-two hours is prima facie
evidence of an intent to violate that order.' 0 There is no official commentary construing the statute," nor is there any available judicial in18, 1976, at 24, 29. See also Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1976, at 1, col. 1. Legal commentators uniformly agree that child-snatching has reached epidemic proportions. See, e.g.,
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JUIRISDICTION ACT, Prefatory Note; Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the
Conflict of Laws, 22 VAlx. L. REV. 1207, 1216-17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer, U.C.C.J.A.].
7. Children may serve as a convenient weapon in the marital dispute. "It is common knowledge that in property negotiations that precede divorce, children are often
part of the bargain. They are frequently disposed of in exchange for advantageous property and support terms or out of personal motivation unrelated to their well-being." Bodenheimer, The Multiplicity of Child Custody Proceedings and Problems of California
Law, 23 STAN. L. REv. 703, 721 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer, Multiplicity
of Custody Proceedings];see Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 85, 216 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1971)
(child used as "'tool'" in parental conflict); Davis, Sociological and Statistical Analysis,
10 LAw &CONTEMP. PROB. 700, 708 (1944).
8. See note 37 and accompanying text infra.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-320.1 (1969). For analogous statutes see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 278 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-97, -98 (West
1972); Ky. REV. STAT. § 509.070 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.26 (West Cum. Supp.
1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 135.45, .50 (McKinney 1975).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-320.1 (1969) reads:
Transporting child outside the State with intent to violate custody order.
-When any court of competent jurisdiction in this State shall have awarded
custody of a child under the age of sixteen years, it shall be a felony for any
person with the intent to violate the court order to take or transport, or cause
to be taken or transported, any such child from any point within this State to
any point outside the limits of this State or to keep any such child outside the
limits of this State. Such crime shall be punishable by a fine in the discretion
of the court or by imprisonrmtent in the State's prison for not more than three
years, in the discretion of the court, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Provided that keeping a child outside the limits of the State in violation of a
court order for a period in excess of seventy-two hours shall be prima facie
evidence that the person charged intended to violate the order at the time of
taking.
11. The sole official reference to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-320.1 (1969) is found
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terpretation. 12 Despite the lack of a definitive statement of legislative
history and intent,'" the purposes of section 14-320.1 are readily discern-

ible from an analysis of the present status of custody litigation in the
United States.
As a general rule, both in North Carolina

4

and in most other

American jurisdictions, parents possess a primary natural and legal right
to their children' 5 and each parent is equally entitled to their custody.' 6

This right may be terminated upon judicial determination that the best
interests of the child require placement with one parent or, in some
instances, a third party. 7 Jurisdiction in such cases is presently exercised on three grounds:' 8 (1) domicile of the child within the state;'
(2) in personam jurisdiction over all of the custody claimants;20 or (3)
in a cursory opinion by former Attorney General Robert Morgan. 40 N.C. ATr'Y GEN.
BIENNIAL REP. 711 (1969).

12. A thorough search by the author of North Carolina appellate decisions failed
to produce any mention of this statute. Judicial interpretations of similar statutes, listed
in note 9 supra, are extremely scant.
13. A further, independent attempt by the author to procure official construction
of this statute proved unsuccessful. Former Senator Sankey W. Robinson, who introduced the statute as S. 48, 1969 N.C. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. could not be reached for
comment. An informal survey of counsel in the Attorney General's Office in Raleigh,
local lawyers and prominent legal scholars in North Carolina family law yielded no further information.
14. See, e.g., Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 87, 216 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1975); Thomas
v. Pickard, 18 N.C. App. 1, 4, 195 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
16. Custody has been defined as the relationship that exists between parents and
children in a normal, ongoing family. It encompasses the right of the custodian to supervise, care for and educate the child.

H. CLARK, THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS

IN THE UNITED STATES 573 (1968). The right of a parent to the custody of his child
is incident to the parent's legal obligation, based on biological tie, to nurture and care
for the child. The parent's right is deemed superior to all others and, although not absolute, may be interfered with or denied only for substantial reasons. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (custody rights are "far more precious. . . than property
rights"); James v. Pretlow, 242 N.C. 102, 104, 86 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1955); Thomas,
Child Abuse & Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REv. 293, 340 (1972).
17. See Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881) (first judicial mention of best interests standard); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925) (first clear repudiation of primacy of parental rights over best interests of the child); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.2(a) (1976) (codification of the best interests standard). The welfare of the
child is the paramount consideration in custody determinations to which "even parental
love must yield." Griffin v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 411, 75 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1953).
It is "the polar star by which the discretion of the courts is to be guided." In re Lewis,
88 N.C. 31, 34 (1883).
18.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws

§ 79, Comment a (1971).

19. Domicile in this context is defined as the place with which one has the most
"settled connection" and considers to be home. H. CLARK, supra note 16, at 144. A
child's domicile is assumed to be that of the parent with whom he lives. Id. at 151.
Child-custodian relations were traditionally viewed as the exclusive task of the domiciliary state. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1934).
20. See generally May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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physical presence of the child in the state.21 The majority of states, 22
including North Carolina,23 specifically provide that any one of these
concurbases is sufficient for jurisdictional purposes. Consequently,
24
unusual.
not
is
states
more
or
two
in
rent jurisdiction
The extraterritorial effect of a state's custody decree is question25
The United States Supreme Court, although addressing the
able.
issue of interstate custody disputes on four occasions,

26

has failed to de-

termine conclusively whether a state must give full faith and credit to
a sister state's custody decree.2 7 In the landmark case of Halvey v. Hal21. Justification for this jurisdictional base derives from the doctrine of parens patriae. Once the child is present in a state, that state acquires a vital interest which "has
its origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless" within its borders.
Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925).
22. See, e.g., Casteel v. Casteel, 45 N.J. Super. 338, 132 A.2d 529 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1957); Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958); Reed v. Reed,
11 Ohio Misc. 93, 229 N.E.2d 113 (C.P. 1967).
Some states seem to require that the child be domiciled within the borders of the
state before jurisdiction will be exercised in a custody dispute. See, e.g., Brown v.
Brown, 105 Ariz. 273, 463 P.2d 71 (1969); Stallings v. Bass, 204 Ga. 3, 48 S.E.2d 822
(1948); Tureson v. Tureson, 281 Minn. 107, 160 N.W.2d 552 (1968).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.5(c)(2) (1976) provides that jurisdiction to enter
custody orders attaches "when the minor child resides, has his domicile or is physically
present" in North Carolina or when the court has personal jurisdiction of the claimants.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-2 (1976) defines minor as "any person who has not reached
the age of eighteen years." See generally 3 R. LEE, NoRTH CAROLINA FAmiLY LAW §
222 (Supp. 1976).
24. Justice Traynor, who first proposed alternate jurisdictional bases in Sampsell
v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948), recognized the potential for
concurrent jurisdiction: "[I]f the child is living in one state but domiciled in another,
the courts of both states may have jurisdiction over the question of its custody." Id.
at 779, 197 P.2d at 750. He counseled confidence in other states' decisions and use
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens to "avoid interminable and vexatious litigation"
which could, and in fact did, result. Id. at 778-80, 197 P.2d at 750. The concept of
concurrent jurisdiction has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Hudak, supra note 3, at
534 (characterized as the "Pandora's box of legally unbounded 'discretion' to judges").
See generally Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for
ExtralitigiousProceedings, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as The Interstate Child]; Ratner, Child Custody in a FederalSystem, 62 MICH. L. REv. 795 (1964).
25. Three theories support a state's refusal to recognize a sister state's decree: (1)
the issuing state's failure to acquire proper jurisdiction; (2) a change in circumstances
sufficient to warrant modification of the prior decree, see notes 30 & 32 infra; and (3)
the inapplicability of the full faith and credit doctrine, see note 27 infra.
26. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958);
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
27. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1, in conjunction with the enabling statute, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1738, 1739 (1970), provides that the records of judicial proceedings of one state shall
have the same force and effect in every state. See generally Corwin, The "Full Faith
and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 371 (1933); Jackson, Full Faith and CreditThe Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945).
A vigorous split of opinion exists on the bench, between states and among prominent legal scholars as to the proper application of the full faith and credit clause to
custody decrees. Justice Frankfurter, the most vocal advocate against use of the doctrine
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vey, 28 the Court did hold, however, that even if the doctrine of full faith

and credit is applicable to custody decrees, such an award would have

"no constitutional claim to a more conclusive or final effect in the State

of the forum, than it has in the State where rendered.

'2

Thus, if the

in this area, argued that "the child's welfare in a custody case has such a claim upon
the State that its responsibility is obviously not to be foreclosed by a prior adjudication
reflecting another State's discharge of its responsibility at another time." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The national policy of
using full faith and credit to curb litigious strife is viewed as subordinate to insuring
a proper custody determination. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 613-14 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619-21 (1947) (Rutledge,
J.,concurring); Comment, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody Decrees, 73 YALE L.J. 134, 140-41 (1963) (against application; state experimentation in
areas of social policy is essential to the effective functioning of the federal system)
[hereinafter cited as Full Faith and Credit]. Proponents counter that child welfare, although an admirable goal, does not sufficiently warrant an exception to the full faith
and credit clause. Ratner, supra note 24, at 798. Justice Jackson, a forceful critic of
Frankfurter's interpretation, concluded that failure to apply the doctrine would "reduce
the law of custody to a rule of seize-and-run." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 542
(1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). One commentator has asserted that children "need the
benefits of full faith and credit more than ordinary litigants to assure the stability of
custody arrangements and the continuity of family attachments" so essential to their
well-being. Bodenheimer, U.C.C.J.A., supra note 6, at 1212. See note 37 and accompanying text infra for discussion of the importance of stability in the child's development. At least one commentator believes that if forced to decide the issue the Supreme
Court would embrace Justice Frankfurter's position. Currie, Full Faith and Credit,
Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 89, 115. But see Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 609-16 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (majority
failed to adopt Frankfurter's total rejection of full faith and credit as applied to custody
decrees); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 79, Comment c (1971).
At least three states have abandoned any pretense of recognizing sister state custody
decrees on grounds of either full faith and credit or comity. See Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 137-38, 62 A.2d 521, 527-28 (1948); Moyer v. Moyer, 171 Kan.
495, 233 P.2d 711 (1951); Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371, 377, 235 N.E.2d 109, 111,
288 N.Y.S.2d 44, 48 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968); Bachman v. Mejias,
1 N.Y.2d 575, 580, 136 N.E.2d 866, 869, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907 (1956).
North Carolina decisions clearly hold that a sister state's custody decree is entitled
to full faith and credit in the absence of a change in circumstances. See, e.g., Spence
v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 683, 198 S.E.2d 537, 545 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918
(1974); In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 201 (1966), noted in 45 N.C.L. REv.
842, 844-50 (1967); In re Osborne, 205 N.C. 716, 719, 172 S.E. 491, 492 (1934). See
also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7(b) (1976).
28. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
29. Id. at 614. In Halvey the Court held that a Florida custody award rendered
pursuant to an ex parte divorce decree was modifiable in New York since Florida retained the ability to so modify it. The Court reaffirmed Halvey in two subsequent cases,
relying on the holding to avoid reaching the constitutional question of the applicability
of full faith and credit to custody decrees. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962)
(South Carolina not bound by a Virginia order dismissing a habeas corpus custody petition since Virginia itself did not award res judicata effect to such orders); Kovacs v.
Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958) (North Carolina could properly refuse to recognize a New
York modification of a North Carolina decree, and thereby modify New York's decree,
if there was a finding of changed circumstances). See also Wurfel, Choice of Law Rules
in North Carolina, 48 N.C.L. REv. 243, 301 (1970) (discussion of Kovacs v. Brewer);
Full Faith and Credit, supranote 27.,
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custody order is modifiable in the issuing state, as it commonly is,8 0 it
is likewise modifiable in the forum state, provided that an adequate
jurisdictional base has been established. Since physical presence of the
child in the state is the simplest way to gain access to a more sympathetic forum,"' physical custody of the child becomes a primary goal
in the attempt to acquire a more favorable custody decree.
Given the great ease with which courts reopen custody questions
and modify decrees,32 the general judicial proclivity to favor local petitioners,3 and the ability of a child-snatcher to negotiate state boundaries with speed and mobility, easily establishing jurisdiction in favor-

able states, parental kidnapping is presently not merely permitted, but
is actually encouraged.

4

By agreeing to relitigate custody decisions,

30. Virtually every state provides that custody decrees may be modified upon a
showing of change in circumstances, the rationale being that developing children have
changing needs that must be satisfied by the parent best able to do so, an ability that
may change even over a relatively short period of time. See, e.g., Spence v. Durham,
283 N.C. 671, 683-84, 198 S.E.2d 537, 545 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974);
Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 75, 145 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1965); N.C. GrN. STAT.
§ 50-13.7(a) (1976).
31. See note 21 and accompanying text supra. The most sympathetic state is usually the one in which the snatching parent resides or is domiciled.
32. The primary justification for modification is a finding of a change in circumstances, "easily made when a court is so inclined." Morill v. Morill, 83 Conn. 479, 492,
77 A. 1, 6 (1910). See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 135 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Wilsonoff
v. Wilsonoff, 514 P.2d 1264 (Alas. 1973); Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N.W.2d
60 (1950). See also A. EHRBNZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICr OF LAws § 87,
at 289-90 (1962); 3 R. LEE, supra note 23, § 228, at 46; Wurfel, Recognition of Foreign
Judgments, 50 N.C.L. REv. 21, 64 (1971) (evidence of such change usually available);
Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REv. 345, 352
(1953) (change in circumstances merely a manner of speech supporting a preconceived
result). North Carolina decisions, however, consistently require a substantial change in
circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. See, e.g., Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C.
358, 362, 204 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1974); King v. Allen, 25 N.C. App. 90, 92, 212 S.E.2d
396, 397, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 259, 214 S.E.2d 431 (1975); Harrington v. Harrington,
16 N.C. App. 628, 630, 192 S.E.2d 638, 639 (1972); Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App.
401, 406, 170 S.E.2d 140, 144 (1969) (mere removal of the child out of the forum state
is insufficient change).
33. The problem of "hometown chauvinism" is a judicial reality. One commentator explains:
A judge may often be disinclined to change his own custody decree or that of
a colleague on the bench of his own state, but when the decree of another state
is involved, there are no external controls to counteract the sense of power and
competition that sometimes prevails. The second judge may believe that he
can do better for the child-or perhaps better for the local petitioner ....
Bodenheimer, U.C.C.J.A., supra note 6, at 1210-11. But see Foster, A Review of Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child, 12 WILLIAMETE L.J. 545, 552 n.28 (1976) (seriousness
with which judges take parens patriae responsibility, often agonizing more about reaching right results in contested custody cases than any other type of decision).
34. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 539 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Comment, Legalized Kidnapping of Children by Their Parents, 80 DiCK. L. REV. 305,
305 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Legalized Kidnapping].
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courts in effect reward child-snatchers with the prospect of a more advantageous custody award. Yet, if the court refuses to reopen the

question, it risks perpetuating an order incongruent with the best interests of the child. Thus, in the midst of the "confused and chaotic"
judicial free-for-all of American custody litigation, 5 the rule of "seizeand-run"30 prevails, and the specter of child-snatching is raised.
Child-snatching not only defames the integrity of the judiciary and

the finality and efficacy of its decrees, but it is also severely detrimental
to the development of the snatched child.

Overwhelming sociological

and psychological data conclusively establish that stability in a child's
environment is imperative to successful emotional development and

character formation.

7

The severe shortcomings in interstate custody

law that permit unchecked litigation and relitigation deny innumerable

children the security and stability of permanent homes.3 8
snatching thus raises issues that merit official concern.

Child-

35. Hudak, supra note 3, at 533; see Hixson v. Hixson, 199 Or. 559, 263 P.2d 597
(1953) (husband filed between sixty and seventy separate documents in regard to custody); Allen v. Allen, 200 Or. 678, 268 P.2d 358 (1952) (two children of tender years
subject to seven separate custodial contentions between parents in nine years in courts
of Oklahoma, California and Oregon); Munroe v. Munroe, 47 Wash. 2d 391, 287 P.2d
482 (1955) (parents filed between twenty and thirty custodial contempt actions against
each other in three years); Bodenheimer, Multiplicity of Custody Proceedings, supra
note 7, at 719-20.
36. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 542 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
37. [O]ne of the critical aspects of a child's development is the need for stability in order to develop a sense of identity. When a child is kept suspended,
never quite knowing what will happen to him next, he must likewise suspend
the shaping of his personality.
S[Stability of the environment is far more crucial than its precise
nature and content. The one thing with which children have most difficulty
coping is unpredictable variation, and this is especially critical between the
ages of two and adolescence.
Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21
SYRAcusE L. Rav. 55, 64, 71 (1969). See also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & J. SoLNrr,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) (excellent psychological dissertation
on the importance of stability) (thoroughly discussed in Foster, supra note 33); Hudak,
supra note 3, at 523-24; Bodenheimer, U.C.C.I.A., supra note 6, at 1208-09; Note, In
the Child's Best Interests: Rights of Natural Parents in Child Placement Proceedings,
51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 446, 446 n.1 (1976) (list of authoritative psychological support). For
a specific example of a child traumatized by custodial change see Paschall v. Paschall,
26 N.C. App. 491, 216 S.E.2d 415 (1975).
38. The most recent analysis of marriage and divorce statistics estimates that
1,021,000 children under eighteen were involved in divorce litigation in 1972, and therefore vulnerable to custody relitigation. This figure represents a substantial increase from
the 330,000 children involved in 1952. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
3 VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1972, MARRIAGE AND DIvORcE, at 2-9 (1976).
See also Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation:
Modification of Custody In and Out of State, 46 COLO. L. Rav. 495, 495 & n.3 (1975).
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Previous attempts, both judicial and legislative, to remedy the
problem of interstate child-snatching have proven sorely inadequate.
Judicial efforts, primarily through imposition of the "clean hands" doc-

trine 39 and application of the principle of forum non conveniens,40 have
failed to provide sufficient relief. The threat of pecuniary loss arising

from (1) civil liability in a suit instituted by the child himself for false
imprisonment and assault, 41 (2) civil liability in a suit by the custodial
parent for mental distress, 42 or (3) judicial reduction of the alimony
or child support due the snatching parent, 43 has not effectively deterred
child-snatching. Traditional legislative remedies, most commonly in
the form of statutory provisions for the imposition of civil contempt
charges 44 or injunctive decrees 45 against snatching parents, have likewise proved inadequate.
39. In theory, this doctrine requires that the violator of a sister state's decree be
denied access to the forum on the ground that he does not come with "clean hands."
See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 32, §§ 88-89. Use of the doctrine has been
hampered because of (1) the failure of courts to apply it when detrimental to the child,
see, e.g., In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 276, 413 P.2d 744, 749 (1966)
(to hold otherwise would inequitably punish innocent children for the wrongs of their
parents); Smith v. Smith, 43 Del. 268, 274, 45 A.2d 879, 881 (Super. Ct. 1946); and
(2) the inapplicability of the doctrine when a child is legally in the forum state during
an authorized visit with the non-custodial parent. Washington and Wisconsin, however,
have offered exemplary leadership in effective application of the clean hands rule. See
Ex parte Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d 419, 174 P.2d 790 (1946); Zillmer v. Zillmer, 8 Wis.
2d 657, 100 N.W.2d 564, rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 8 Wis. 2d 657, 101 N.W.
2d 703 (1960). North Carolina has shown an inclination toward recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees in cases of parental defiance. See, e.g., Sadler v. Sadler,
234 N.C. 492 65 S.E.2d 345 (1951); Allman v. Register, 233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E.2d 861
(1951); Hardee v. Mitchell, 230 N.C. 40, 51 S.E.2d 884 (1949); Hopkins v. Hopkins,
8 N.C. App. 162, 174 S.E.2d 103 (1970). But see In re Craigo, 266 N.C. 92, 145
S.E.2d 376 (1965); Dees v. McKenna, 261 N.C. 373, 134 S.E.2d 644 (1964).
40. Forum non conveniens refers to the discretionary refusal of a court to hear
a suit that, although properly brought before it, would in the interests of justice and the
convenience of the litigants be best tried elsewhere. For codification of this doctrine
see N.C. GN. STAT. § 50-13.5(c)(5), (6) (1976). Reluctance to apply this doctrine
is partially attributable to the judicial view that "[i]t is a grave matter to send to the
court of another state one who has properly brought his action here." 3 R. LEE, supra
note 23, § 229, at 50.
41. Institution of a suit by a child against his parents is presently possible in only
thirteen states that have abolished the doctrine of parental immunity. See Legalized
Kidnapping, supra note 34, at 309 n.32 for cases abrogating parental immunity. Even
if the action were generally maintainable, recovery would be uncommon due to the
numerous, predominately successful, available defenses. Id. at 310-11.
42. See, e.g., Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930); Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 78 S.E. 222 (1913). Infrequent use of this remedy may be partially
due to the common law rule that loss of services must be proved before a parent is entitled to any damages for the abduction of his child.
43. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 103 Cal. App. 2d 276, 229 P.2d 830 (1951)
(reduction in alimony); 3 R. LEF, supra note 23, § 222, at 16.
44. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.3(a) (1976).
45. See, e.g., id § 50-13.3(b).
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The potential use of general statutory kidnap4 6 prohibitions to
punish snatching parents has been hampered by the frequency with which
such sanctions are deemed inapplicable in the context of the parentchild relationship. Until recently, parents were specifically exempt
from the North Carolina kidnap law, 47 and prior to the enactment of
General Statutes section 14-320.1,48 the kidnap of a child by his parent
invoked no criminal penalties whatsoever in this state. Similar parental exemptions are found specifically in the federal law,49 and either
specifically5" or by implication"' in the laws of several states. Criticism
is justifiably levied against such exemptions. Parental kidnapping,
52
while arguably not as reprehensible as kidnapping by a third party,
is nevertheless detrimental to the welfare of the child and to society
as a whole. A parent, by an adverse court decree, is divested of his
"parental rights" and acquires the same status as a third party.53 A

logical, consistent interpretation of the kidnap law would seem to require that the non-custodial snatching parent be treated as a third party

through the imposition of some criminal sanctions. 4
In adopting section 14-320.1, the legislature rightly recognized the
severity of the interstate child-snatching issue, the inadequacy of pre46. Kidnapping has been defined as "the unlawful taking and carrying away of a
human being by force and against his will." State v. Barbour, 278 N.C. 449, 454, 180
S.E.2d 115, 118 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1023 (1972). See generally PERKINS ON
CRimrNAL LAw 176-84 (2d ed. 1969).
47. Compare Law of May 15, 1933, ch. 542, § 1, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 890
(formerly codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (1969)), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1439 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
48. See notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text supra.
49. Congress specifically exempted parents from the operation of the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1975), in response to the fears of the House
Judiciary Committee that if there were no exemption parents who take their children
across state lines in defiance of custody decrees would be prosecuted. Legalized Kidnapping, supra note 34, at 306. The exception is, however, strictly construed. Miller
v. United States, 123 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1941). Attempts to amend the federal statute
have proven unsuccessful, presumably due to the predominant view that the police and
the F.B.I. should not become entangled in domestic controversy. See generally Note,
The Problems of ParentalKidnapping, 10 Wyo. L.J. 225 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
ParentalKidnapping].
50. See, e.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.03(b)(2) (Vernon 1974).
51. See, e.g., Burns v. Commonwealth, 129 Pa. 138, 18 A. 756 (1889).
52. The parent is presumably not motivated by the greed and malice of the third
party taker, but rather by a "natural and sometimes irresistible urge to possess those who
are the natural objects of their affections." ParentalKidnapping, supra note 48, at 226.
But see note 7 supra.
53. Lee v. People, 53 Colo. 507, 509, 127 P. 1023, 1024 (1912).
54. But see Legalized Kidnapping, supra note 34, at 308 (argument that as long
as parent retains the duty of support he is justified in claiming immunity even in the
face of an adverse decree for permanent custody).
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vious remedial efforts, and the imperative for innovative action. However, the efficacy of the statute in the prevention and elimination of
child-snatching is subject to criticism. The legislature may have
addressed the issue, but it has failed to solve the problem.
The threat of criminal conviction and the corresponding punishments invoked pursuant to section 14-320.1 have not proven effective
as a deterrent to child-snatching. Most parents, including potential
child-snatchers, are probably unaware of the existence of the law.
Furthermore, it is likely that even if adequately informed of the consequences of a child-snatching conviction, the intense emotion accompanying the typical snatching situation would preclude any appreciable
deterrent effect.
The utility of section 14-320.1 as a deterrent is further reduced
by the practical inability of North Carolina to enforce the law beyond
its borders. Although classification of child-snatching as a crime invokes usage of the extradition mechanism to prosecute violating parents
located outside the state, the difficulties inherent in the extradition
process itself render the law virtually useless. The United States Constitution requires that a person charged with a crime who flees from
justice and is found in another state be delivered up and removed to
the state having jurisdiction over him on demand of the executive
authority of that state.5 As a matter of federal law, the chief state
executive has a purely ministerial duty to extradite when the circumstances are within the contemplation of the Constitution." The governor, however, does have great discretion in the initial determination of
whether the accused has been adequately charged and is in fact a "fugitive from justice. '5 7 If the governor decides extradition is unwarranted and refuses to comply with the request, there are no means of
compulsion. His decision is final and not subject to judicial review.58
55. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1970) (enabling
legislation).
56. Biddinger v. Police Comm'r, 245 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1917); Drew v. Thaw, 235
U.S. 432, 439 (1914).
57. The phrase "fugitive from justice" implies that one commits a crime within a
state and then withdraws himself from its jurisdiction. Arguably, a parent who takes
a child outside of North Carolina in violation of a custody decree does not commit a
crime in North Carolina and then flee from the state. Rather, leaving the state with
the child is in fact the crime. Thus, the accused may be deemed as not having fled
from justice since the crime does not occur until the foreign jurisdiction is actually entered and extradition is therefore unwarranted.
58. The courts will not inquire into the motives that induce a governor to grant,
honor or refuse an extradition request. Such inquiry would be adverse to the executive's
right to act freely within his constitutional authority. See Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S.
192, 203-04 (1906); In re Sultan, 115 N.C. 57, 63, 20 S.E. 375, 378 (1894).
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It is unlikely that a state will agree to extradite a parent who has

violated a foreign decree when that state has judicially rejected the
validity of the prior decree and awarded custody according to its determination that the violating parent is the proper custodian. 59 Extradition, generally regarded as a serious procedure, may be successfully
avoided on any one of several available technical grounds when a state

is so inclined.

0

Thus, any deterrent effect that section 14-320.1 might

have seems far outweighed by the enormous increase in hostility and

further extra-legal conduct that use of the criminal law itself engenders.
Section 14-320.1 fails to address directly the question of where
and with whom the child should live. Pursuant to the statute, however,

a snatching parent may be imprisoned and thereby completely precluded from an assertion of custody. Such a result, however, may be
incongruent with the realistic demands of the situation. Since self-help

is presently the "ultimate authority"61 in custody litigation, a snatching

62
parent should not automatically be stigmatized as an unfit custodian.

Ironically, the current status of custodial determination drives persons
who are otherwise conscientious, law-abiding citizens to child-snatching

tactics, often against their inclinations. Indeed, lawyers who are reluctant to advise the use of snatching maneuvers frequently place their
clients at a decided disadvantage.6 3

The lack of extraterritorial respect for custody decrees and their
concomitant instability are not significantly affected by section
14-320.1. The act is inapplicable when a child is forcibly removed
from another state in violation of an existing decree and brought into
59. See In re Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1964) (California
refused to extradite an abducting mother to Texas on a kidnapping charge and granted
her custody of the child). The chief extradition officer in the Governor's Office in
Raleigh confirmed that in such situations extradition would be unlikely, offering in support examples of unreported incidences encountered through her office. Telephone interview with Ms. Sarah Jones, January 21, 1976.
60. Extradition may be refused if the chief state executive determines that (1) the
accused has not been adequately identified, see, e.g., Lee Gin Bor v. Ferrari, 55 F.2d 86
(1st Cir. 1932), (2) the accused is not a fugitive from justice, see, e.g., In re Hubbard,
201 N.C. 472, 475-76, 160 S.E. 569, 571 (1931); note 57 supra, (3) the warrant does
not sufficiently charge the accused with a crime, see, e.g., Cassis v. Fair, 126 W. Va.
557, 29 S.E.2d 245 (1944), or (4) the request was made with bad faith or for ulterior
purposes, see, e.g., In re Sultan, 115 N.C. 57, 20 S.E. 375 (1894).
61. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 539 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
62. For example, if Mother has a custody decree from state X and Father snatches
the child to state Y and obtains a favorable custody decree there, Mother's only recourse
may be to re-snatch the child back to state X.
63. UNEFORM CHILD CUSTODY JUTRIsDIcToN ACT, Prefatory Note.
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North Carolina where the issue of custody may be relitigated.0" While
the legislature seeks to punish child-snatchers, the court retains the
ability to reward them with favorable decrees. In addition, the statute
does not apply when a custody determination is pending prior to the
issuance of a final decree; nor does it affect the relitigation of custody
while a child is legally visiting the non-custodial parent in the foreign
forum.
Perhaps the ultimate evidence of the impotence of General Statutes section 14-320.1 is the fact that it simply is not used. There has
been no appellate court consideration of the statute", and there is an
appalling lack of knowledge as to its very existence. 66 In the mean67
time, incidences of child-snatching continue to increase.
Clearly, the imposition of criminal sanctions alone has failed to
prohibit child-snatchings. Crucial changes in the structure of interstate
custody litigation are no longer merely desirable, they are essential.
Various legal commentaries have advanced a plethora of prospective
solutions.68 Among them are suggestions that (1) modification of custody decrees be governed by the law of venue,69 (2) all out-of-state
visitation be restricted, ° (3) extrajudicial proceedings be employed in
72
the determination of custody, 71 (4) congressional action be invoked,
64. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (West Cum. Supp. 1977) for exemplary treatment of this problem. The legislation provides that it is a felony to hold or hide a child
in California in violation of a custody order.
65. See note 12 supra.
66. See note 13 supra. Counsel in the child custody department of the Attorney
General's Office in Raleigh confirmed the fact that the statute is rarely invoked and little
is known about it. Telephone interview with Mr. Parks Eisenhower, January 24, 1976.
An informal survey by the author of local attorneys practicing in the area of child custody evidenced a similar lack of knowledge.
67. See notes 5 & 6 supra.
68. See Bodenheimer, Multiplicity of Custody Proceedings, supra note 7, at 72634 for general remedial recommendations.
69. Hudak, supra note 3, at 541-42, 547.
70. Id. at 535 (discussing York v. York, 246 Iowa 132, 141-42, 67 N.W.2d 28, 34
(1954) (refusal to allow out-of-state visitation on theory that presence of children in
foreign jurisdiction might force custodial parent to defend his rights that had been already fairly and conclusively determined)).
71. See The Interstate Child, supra note 24. A procedure similar to that used
in adoption and mental commitments has been proposed on the ground that an adversarial system can never effectuate the child's best interests. The plan encompasses a
concentration of responsibility for the child in a single "guardianship" court which would
maintain a complete dossier, appoint individual curators, and to which all subsequent
actions would be referred. Id. at 9-10.
72. Currie, supra note 27, at 115-17. Arguably Congress alone can provide adequate relief since it is the only body that can effectively collate and consider the widespread and varied experiences, the relevant sociological and psychological data and the
legal expertise imperative to satisfactory resolution.
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(5) a vigorous policy of self-restraint and cooperation be exercised by the
judiciary, 73 and (6) uniform legislation be nationally enacted.7 4 The
need for far-reaching and effective change is immediate. In view of
the slight likelihood that any action will be taken by Congress or the
Supreme Court in the near future, 75 and the time and difficulties inherent in complete rejection of the judicial process, uniform legislation
emerges as the most practical and realistic solution offered thus far.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act attempts to substitute
orderly, uniform processes of law for the presently chaotic state of affairs. 76 Primarily designed to "alleviate the plight of 'interstate children,' "7 the Act imposes jurisdictional standards for initial and subsequent custodial determinations. If uniformly observed, such standards
would terminate child-snatching by rendering it utterly useless to gain
physical custody of a child.
The Act requires that exclusive authority to decide or modify
custody be vested in only one court, to which all other courts must
defer. Mere physical presence of the child within the state is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Rather, the state that has the most substantial connection with the child will be the only state in which custody
may be properly litigated, both initially 8 and with regard to modification."' All parties who have been served or who submit to the jurisdiction of the court will be bound by the ensuing decree.8 0 Codification
73. See notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text supra.
74. For example, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act discussed at notes
76-86 and accompanying text infra. See generally Bodenheimer, U.C.C.J.A., supra note
6.
75. The Supreme Court has traditionally avoided involvement in domestic relations, properly leaving family affairs for the most part within the realm of the states.
Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 59394 (1890). See generally Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (exhaustive elucidation of the history of the federal abstention doctrine as applied to domestic relations).
76. UNIFORM CHLD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT,Prefatory Note.
77. Bodenheimer, U.C.C.J.A., supra note 6, at 1207; see id. at 1219-21.
78. UNIFO M CHLD CUSTODY JURISDICrON ACT § 3.
79. Id. § 14.
80. Id. § 12. This section represents an attempt to avoid the requirement of personal jurisdiction in custody suits. But see May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953)
(plurality ruling that in personam jurisdiction is imperative to the effective termination
of the "personal right" to custody). The decision has been widely criticized as encouraging parents who fear an unfavorable decree to refuse to submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court, thereby avoiding being bound by the decision and prolonging
further final custody determination. See Bodenhemier, U.C.C.I.A., supra note 6, at
1232; Currie, supra note 27, at 113 (contends decision is narrowly limited to facts of
the case); The Interstate Child, supra note 24, at 9 n.42 (contends decision is limited
to facts of the case); Hazard, supra note 4. The practical impact of May has been ap-
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of the "clean hands" doctrine s ' mandates a denial of jurisdiction to anyone who "wrongfully" transports a child out of state.82 The Act further
provides for simplified enforcement of existing decrees88 and requires

84
the replacement of judicial competition with judicial cooperation.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is exemplary.,
Coupled with criminal sanctions such as General Statutes section
14-320.1, the Act's refusal to reward the child-snatching parent with
a favorable decree provides an optimal solution and virtually ensures
the elimination of child-snatching in the United States.
Uniform adoption of the Act is imperative to its success.80 North
Carolina, through both its statutory custody provisions and an admirable
policy of judicial restraint, has reflected an orientation toward the
primacy of the child and the need for judicial cooperation in custody
disputes. This, however, is no longer adequate. The legislature is
therefore urged to consider adoption of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act.
American courts have for far too long "suited the convenience and
desire of the non-custodial parent, while sacrificing the well-being of
[the child].187 Child-snatching poses an odious threat to the child's
preciably diminished due to liberal findings of change in circumstances and corresponding modifiability, and use of long-arm statutes to acquire personal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970). See generally, Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 289, 307-17 (1973).
81. See note 39 supra.
82. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDIC'noN Acr § 8. This section applies even
when no official custody decree has yet been rendered in any other state, thereby attempting to eliminate all forms of "reprehensible" conduct in custody affairs. Further,
custody decrees obtained in contravention of the principles of the Act, through presence
in the state for only a short period, will be refused any recognition. If the child would
be irreparably harmed by strict enforcement of this section, the abductor may be favored
with a decree, but will be punitively charged with all expenses.
83. Id. §§ 13-15.
84. Id. §§ 16-24.
85. But see Hudak, supra note 3, at 547, 549 (criticizes Act as "impractical and
naive" and as having the capacity to perpetrate the evils it seeks to alleviate); Comment,
Family Law: Court's Adoption of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act Offers Little
Hope of Resolving Child Custody Conflicts, 60 MINN. L. REV. 820 (1976).
86. Presently, only nine states have enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5150-5174 (West Curh. Supp. 1977); CoLo. REv. STAT.
§§ 14-13-101 to -126 (1973); HAwAII REV. STAT. H9 583-1 to -26 (Supp. 1975); MD.
CODE ANN. art. 16, §§ 184-207 (Cum. Supp. 1976); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.651 to
.673 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-14-01 to -26 (1971); ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 109.700 to .930 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. H§ 822.01 to .25 (1977); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-143 to -167 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Minnesota has judicially adopted the Act, inconsistent case law notwithstanding. See In re Giblin, - Minn. -, 232 N.W.2d 214
(1975). Adoption of the Act is not reciprocal in effect. Although only nine states
have enacted it, the ramifications should be more far-reaching.
87. Hudak, supra note 3, at 548.
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best interests and insults the equity of our legal structure. The
integrity of the judiciary and the welfare of the child mandate its

elimination.
ANDREA ANN TIM O

Zoning-Restrictions on Mobile Homes:

The Beginning of the

End?
Fifty years after zoning ordinances first underwent judicial exami-

nation' the New Jersey Supreme Court, one of the nation's leading state
forums for zoning adjudication,' in Taxpayers Association v. Weymouth

Township3 upheld the validity of a municipal ordinance that limited the
use of mobile home units within trailer parks to elderly persons. The
Weymouth decision comes just one year after the New Jersey court's
landmark decision in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township

of Mount Laurel4 striking down exclusionary zoning regulations. Considered in light of Mount Laurel, the Weymouth result may appear to
limit the extent to which the court is willing to find an impermissible

exclusionary intent or effect in local land use regulations--even when
those regulations expressly restrict residential land use on the basis of
types of occupancy. 5 The decision could thus be misread as being

another in a series of recent decisions6 that in effect give judicial ap1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see note 22
infra.
2. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING § 6.04, at 119-21 (1972).
3. 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976). A companion case to Weymouth also
upheld zoning ordinances permitting special residential uses for the elderly. Shepard v.
Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976).
4. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
5. See note 10 and accompanying text infra.
6. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S.
Ct. 555 (1977), noted in 55 N.C.L. Rnv. 733 (1977) (upholding municipality's refusal
to rezone a 15 acre parcel from single family to multi-family classification, thus preventing construction of a housing complex for low and moderate income tenants); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a zoning ordinance restricting the use of one-family residences to persons related by blood, adoption or marriage,
or to not more than two unrelated persons); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971),
noted in 50 N.C.L. REv. 369 (1972) (upholding a California constitutional provision
requiring approval by local referendum before low-rent housing projects may be established in a community); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976), noted il 54 N.C.L. REv. 266 (1976)
(upholding a comprehensive zoning plan designed to control the municipality's growth,

